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Abstract 
 
This article analyses the European Union’s response to the threat of the ‘returning foreign 
fighter’ (RFF), referred to with increasing frequency as the ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ (FTF), 
arguing that it has been characterised by a move to (re)frame migration and border control as 
essential aspects of EU counter-terrorism policy. The article offers three important 
observations on the significance of this move. First, it critiques the way in which the EU’s 
response to this problem is based upon and reinforces a narrow understanding of RFFs. 
Second, it argues the EU has invoked the threat from RFFs not with the sole intention of 
preventing terrorism but rather as part of the on-going securitization of migration and the EU 
border. Third, it suggests the threat from RFFs has been invoked as a way of further 
legitimising the EU’s emerging role as a security actor and its embrace of preemptive security 
practice. The article argues throughout that the move to construct the RFF issue in this way 
has important political and social implications for all categories of migrant, with migrant 
populations now deemed a potential source of terrorist threat. 
 
Introduction 
 
In September 2014, European Union (EU) officials briefed European media outlets that a 
major terrorist attack on European soil was now ‘inevitable’ and ‘pre-programmed’ 
(Guardian, 2014). The reason for this bleak threat assessment was that many of the estimated 
5000 EU citizens who were thought to have travelled to Syria to fight in the civil war had 
begun to return home (European Commission, 2015a). For the EU and its member states 
these individuals were of great concern for two main reasons. First, there was a fear that they 
‘may use their newly-acquired experience and skill for terrorist actions’; second, they might 
also ‘spread their radical ideas… or give guidance to others to follow them on their path of 
violence’ (Council of the EU, 2010a: 5). Just over a year later, the terrorist attacks in Paris in 
November 2015, which left over 130 people dead, seemed to confirm the worst fears of EU 
policymakers. The attacks were carried out by a group of individuals, mostly French and 
Belgian citizens, including some that had travelled to the conflict in Syria for training 
purposes, who had returned to commit acts of terrorism against their country of origin 
(Europol, 2016). In the period since these events, the EU has sought to securitize the 
‘returning foreign fighter’ (RFF) issue by putting forward a set of policies under the banner 
of its counter-terrorism response – the ‘fight against terrorism’ – designed to tackle this ‘new’ 
and ‘evolving’ threat. 
 
For the EU, further incidents in Brussels in March 2016, which were also thought to have 
involved RFFs, as well as a spate of terrorist attacks across Europe in 2016 and 2017, have 
amplified a sense of crisis in Europe over the ongoing threat from terrorism. It is within the 
context of this crisis that the EU has presented a specific set of policies as an appropriate 
response to this issue. The most significant dimension of this response has involved the 
(re)framing of a set of migration and border control measures, including the use of pre-
existing EU databases and monitoring mechanisms, as measures that can allow for the 
detection of ‘suspicious travel movements’ or behaviour that might indicate an individual 
leaving or entering the EU to be a RFF (Council of the EU, 2013: 3). Interestingly, these 
initiatives are underpinned by a logic that suggests they provide the potential for the 
generation of preemptive or anticipatory knowledge about the threat from terrorism and are 
reflective, more broadly, of an emerging ‘EU security culture’ based around the adoption of 
preemptive forms of security practice (de Goede, 2011). Specifically, the headline policy goal 
put forward by the EU in response to this threat has been the creation and implementation of 
a European-wide Passenger Name Record Agreement (PNR). This focus on travel, migration 
and border control is however perplexing given that statistics demonstrate in Europe at least, 
notwithstanding a few incidents, the majority of those arrested for terrorist offences have not 
travelled abroad and do not cross borders in order to do so.1  
 
In trying to understand why the EU has adopted this approach the article offers three main 
arguments. First, the EU’s response to this problem is based upon and reinforces a narrow 
understanding of RFFs as a counter-terrorism issue. The article shows how the EU’s move to 
adopt the label ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ (FTF) exacerbates this problem by artificially 
constructing all foreign fighters (FF) as terrorists, when in reality FFs can occupy multiple 
categorisations depending on how and in what context the term is being used. Second, the 
EU’s conceptualisation of RFFs plays a specific role in the meshing of counter-terrorism with 
migration management, in that it has advanced border control as the most appropriate 
response to this issue. This includes, for the first time, the development of practices that allow 
for the monitoring of non-suspect citizen movement into, across and out of the EU area. As 
such, it is argued that the threat from RFFs plays a key role in the ongoing securitization of 
regular and ‘irregular’ migration in the EU area (see Vaughan-Williams, 2016).  Third, more 
broadly, the threat from RFFs has been invoked as a way of further justifying the EU’s 
evolving role as a holistic security actor and its embrace of preemptive security practice. 
Throughout, I argue the EU response to RFFs reinforces the perception that there is a 
relationship between migration and terrorism, with important political and social implications 
for migrant populations now deemed a potential source of terrorist threat. 
 
To make this argument the article is structured as follows. The first section begins by setting 
out how securitization theory can be adapted to the study of the EU and used to analyse the 
RFF issue. This section draws insights from the second generation, ‘post-Copenhagen’ 
approach to securitization theory developed by the likes of Olav Knudsen (2001), Stuart Croft 
(2012) and Holger Stritzel (2012), as well as the work of Felix Ciuta (2009), to make a case 
for reading EU security policy contextually through reference to the spatial and normative 
dimensions of the securitization process. The second part of the article employs discourse 
analysis to map the construction of the EU response to RFF, as well as to provide critical 
analysis of the political and social implications of the securitization of this issue. I conclude 
by reflecting upon the move to place migration and border control within the realm of 
counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Analysing the EU’s ‘Returning Foreign Fighter’ Discourse: Securitization and 
Discourse Analysis 
 
Since the beginning of 2013, the issue of RFFs has become a regular topic of debate at EU 
level leading it to push for stronger policies on counter-radicalisation, information exchange 
with third countries, enhanced security roles for agencies like Europol, increased 
interoperability of EU databases to detect ‘suspicious’ forms of travel and increased border 
control. By invoking the threat of the RFFs as a way of justifying increased levels of counter-
terrorism cooperation between member states, it is argued the EU has actively sought to 
securitize this issue. To account for the implications of the securitization of the RFF 
phenomena, the article starts by making a case for reconceptualising securitization theory in 
the context of the EU.  
 
Securitization in the European Union: A Post-Copenhagen Securitization Framework and 
Discourse Analysis 
 
For the Copenhagen School (CS) securitization is viewed as a decisive moment, an instance 
in time, where an issue is moved from normal politics to the realm of security politics. For 
the CS, securitization has several stages. First, is the securitizing move, consisting of a 
‘speech act’ made by an actor with authority or discourse-making power. Second, the actor 
making the securitizing move must represent the issue as an existential or extreme threat to 
an audience (the in-group), convincing the audience that their survival is at stake and thereby 
legitimating the adoption of emergency security measures. Third, although the securitizing 
move may or may not lead to the imposition of special or extraordinary measures, the 
audience must accept the securitizing move for the securitization to be considered successful 
(see Buzan, de Wilde and Wæver, 1998). The CS version of securitization - also referred to 
as the linguistic approach - has come to represent the traditional way that the securitization of 
an issue is thought to occur (see Balzacq, 2010). It has, however, led to much debate and 
criticism, not least over its applicability and usefulness in different situations (Balzacq, 2005; 
Ciuta 2009; Hansen, 2000; Wilkinson 2011).  
 
This is certainly the case in the EU where securitization processes operate quite differently 
from the way envisaged by the CS. As Andrew Neal (2009) explains, the way a securitizing 
move operates in the context of the EU is unlike how it works at national level, in that 
although the statements of EU institutions may be easily identifiable as securitizing moves, 
‘the relationship between that discourse and the reception, discussion, legitimation and 
actualization of policy proposals and changes is less clear’ (Ibid: 336). Given the limitations 
of the CS approach in terms of explaining how securitization occurs within the EU, this 
article adopts insights from what Stritzel (2012) has termed the second generation, post-
Copenhagen approach to securitization theory. The purpose of this is not to develop a 
separate approach but rather to extend our understanding of securitization to take account of 
both its performative and sociological dimensions (see Stritzel, 2012: 553; Croft, 2012: 84).2 
 
Following Croft (2012), and borrowing insights from Ciuta (2009),  Neal (2009) and Stritzel 
(2012), this approach involves two key steps. First, it is necessary to relax the core 
commitments of the CS approach, reshaping securitization theory so that it is better suited to 
analysing a supra-national security actor like the EU. Second, following Ciuta’s call for 
consideration of the importance of context in the securitization process, the approach taken 
here makes a case for analysing the spatial and normative dimensions of securitization, with a 
specific focus on what these processes reveal about the formulation of EU counter-terrorism 
policy. The reason for adopting this approach is that it allows for the exploration of words 
and actions that not only include insights from the Copenhagen School’s framework but go 
beyond and extend it, revealing dynamics that would not be accounted for in the traditional 
approach to securitization theory, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between 
securitizing language and security practice (see Wilkinson, 2011).  
 
The first modification to securitization theory involves recognising that securitization is an 
ongoing political (and sociological) process rather than a specific binary moment whereby a 
decision is made in relation to whether (or not) an issue should be moved into the realm of 
security (Salter, 2008). Whilst the focus of the analysis in this article is predominantly on the 
‘speech acts’ contained in the security texts produced by the EU, it is recognised that this is 
an iterative process that involves the constant re-articulation of important issues as a priority 
within the field of EU counter-terrorism policy. This process has been ongoing since at least 
2001 and the re-emergence of the ‘fight against terrorism’ as a key dimension of the EU 
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. This is important in the context of the RFF 
issue in that by viewing securitization as a process rather than an event, it is possible to 
identify how this concern first emerged and the way in which the perception of the threat has 
evolved over time. This draws inspiration from the longitudinal methods favoured by Aglaya 
Snetkov (2017), which allow the analyst to highlight the evolutionary, multifaceted and 
incremental processes through which the securitization of an issue occurs.  
 
Second, the idea that security is all about existential threats and exceptional responses is also 
problematic in the context of the EU. As Neal (2009: 352) explains, ‘much of what is being 
done in the name of security is quiet, technical and unspectacular, in the EU intensely so, and 
just as much again does not declare itself to be in the name of security at all’. Although this is 
also true of security practice in many countries and institutions, it is particularly the case in 
the EU where the discussion and reception of security threats is very different from the 
national arena. Indeed, the communications or statements of the EU institutions are less 
widely reported, and although they play a key role in policy-making, are little ‘debated 
beyond a very narrow specialist audience’ (Ibid: 336). In turn, this has implications for what 
a securitizing move might look like in the context of the EU, where the legitimisation of 
policy proposals and security measures is framed not only through the language of existential 
threat but often through the language and practice of everyday risk and insecurity (see Bigo 
and Tsoukala, 2008) . As Ciuta (2009: 313) explains, ‘European actors still stubbornly speak 
security, even in the absence of existential threats’ but do so in the form of the ‘institutional 
communities in to which they are organised’. 
 
Moreover, although the role of the ‘speech act’ retains importance in terms of identifying 
issues that are framed as danger, risk or threat, the framework employed here emphasises that 
securitization can also be understood as a non-linguistic process (Balzacq, 2010: 22-25) or a 
form of discursive practice (Doty, 1993; Hansen, 2006). This draws parallels with the Paris 
School approach to securitization (see Bigo 2002; 2008), as well as analysts such as Ciuta 
(2009: 312) who believes the role of practice in securitization theory must be ‘reconsidered’. 
In the EU, where securitization manifests itself, we see it not only in the statements of 
politicians and EU institutions or the calculative language and rationalities of risk identifiable 
in EU security policy documents but also in the bureaucratic, mundane, routinized security 
practices made possible by, and designed to mitigate, those same risks (Bigo, 2008).  
 
As Croft (2012) explains, a post-Copenhagen approach involves recognising not only that 
security practice extends beyond the language of existential threats and extraordinary 
measures to include the more mundane practices of everyday forms of security; it also 
involves rethinking securitization as an ongoing process that cannot be understood outside of 
the context within which it is occurring. The purpose of this then, following Ciuta (2009: 
311), is not just to identify the security issues that concern specific actors but to ‘interpret the 
meaning of security as it is deployed by situated actors’. For Ciuta, this commitment entails a 
more consistent understanding of the constructed nature of security, which involves drawing 
attention to the importance of context in the analysis of security issues. The framework 
outlined here emphasises both the spatial and normative dimensions of the securitization of 
the RFF issue because these concepts allow for a deeper engagement with the context within 
which this process occurs and help to reveal the ways in which the threat discourse informs 
the policy response and vice-versa (Hansen, 2006). 
 
To map and analyse the impact of the securitization of the RFF issue, I adopt a two-stage, 
double reading strategy (see for example Shepherd, 2008: 26-33) as a form of discourse 
analysis. This consists of subjecting the selected texts to two readings. First, a descriptive 
reading designed to highlight the key themes upon which the discourse rests and to map the 
various aspects of the securitization process. Second, a wider contextual analysis highlighting 
the ways in which the discourse structures the policy responses to the issues that it describes. 
This stage of the analysis focuses on the securitization of RFFs by charting the ways in which 
the discourse make ‘various practices possible’ and contribute to the performance of security 
and counter-terrorism (Doty, 1993: 303). It analyses the securitization of this issue across the 
spatial and the normative dimensions of the process.3 Discourse analysis is adopted for two 
reasons. First, it provides a method though which to explore the relationship between 
language and policy in the securitization process, uncovering ‘the structures and practices 
that produce the threat image, whose source, mechanisms and effects’ this article seeks to 
explain (Balzacq, 2011: 40). Second, it allows the analyst to problematise and critique the 
representations of threat put into circulation by security actors, as well as to consider the 
wider political and societal implications of the policy discourse (see Baker-Beall, 2016). 
 
Finally, although conceptualising the EU as an actor is problematic, partly because it is ‘a 
highly variegated and heterogeneous set of processes and actors’ (Jackson, 2007: 236), it is 
still possible to identify a common institutional language in the sphere of security and 
counter-terrorism that is consistent across the policy discourse. In terms of the selection of 
texts, priority is given to several key texts produced by the main policy-making institutions of 
the EU, the European Council and the European Commission, as well as reports from other 
intra-institutional agencies and actors such as Europol and the EU Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator (CTC), that are viewed as representative of the EU discourse on counter-
terrorism and RFFs. The empirical analysis is taken from over 100 documents formulated and 
released into the public domain across the period from September 2001 until July 2017. 
Where appropriate, documents produced by other EU institutions and actors in the field of 
European counter-terrorism, as well as a range of secondary texts, such as books, journal 
articles, think-tank policy documents and media reports, are used to substantiate the empirical 
analysis that follows. 
 
Mapping and analysing the securitization of migration, border control and travel in the 
EU: Contextualising the EU response to the ‘returning foreign fighter’ issue 
 
According to Stritzel (2012: 553), exploring the context of securitization moves is important 
in that for ‘scholars post-Copenhagen… the performative power of a speech act cannot only 
be captured in the abstract but needs to be contextually located within broader structures of 
meaning and power’. Before engaging in an analysis of the EU response to the RFF issue, 
therefore, it is important to situate EU policy within the wider international response to this 
problem and to draw attention to several important contextual factors (Ciuta, 2009). First, is 
the perceived scale of the RFF threat, which involves not only the immediate issue of 
individuals who leave to participate in conflicts abroad but also the perception of a longer-
term security threat presented by those who return to their country of origin once hostilities 
have ended. This concern is particularly acute in Europe where a report from May 2018 
produced by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) suggested that of the 
roughly 4000 citizens from EU member states (mostly from Belgium, France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom) that had been drawn to the conflict in Syria, 30 percent of those 
individuals were estimated to have already returned to Europe (see EPRS, 2018). The number 
of returnees – and a fear that they would return en masse with malicious intentions - therefore 
provides an insight into why the EU has moved to reorient its counter-terrorism policy around 
the response to RFFs (see EPRS, 2018). 
 
Second, the development of the EU response has to be understood in the wider context of  
steps taken by other states at the international level to combat the threat from RFFs. The 
Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) has played a key part in this process bringing 
together thirty governments, including the EU, to formulate non-binding policy 
recommendations as part of a multilateral response to the RFF issue. It was at the GCTF that 
the first move to re-label FFs as FTFs was taken. In June 2014, the GCTF released the 
Hague-Marrakesh memorandum which included the first definition of the term FTF. This 
document formed the basis for United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2178, 
agreed in September 2014, which defined FTFs as: 
 
‘Individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or 
nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or 
participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, 
including in connection with armed conflict’. 
 
Not wishing to be left behind, the EU was quick to suggest it must update its approach to take 
account of the UN resolution (see Council of the EU, 2014c). In the period since, the EU 
response has mirrored the call in UNSCR 2178 for signatories to develop policies that are 
specifically designed to restrict travel for the purpose of terrorism. 
 
Third, the response has to be understood in the context of steps taken by governments to stop 
their citizens from travelling to, or returning from, conflict zones. In Europe, this has 
consisted primarily of travel bans but also in some countries through the revoking of 
citizenship. According to Letta Tayler (2016) between 2013 and 2016 at least 47 countries 
developed laws to combat FTFs, with the majority of these measures enacted in order for 
states to comply with UNSCR 2178. In Europe, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, 
Netherlands and the UK have all implemented travel bans for those suspected of wanting to 
travel for the purpose of terrorism, while Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and the UK have 
taken steps to revoke citizenship of nationals that have been convicted of terrorism offences 
abroad or even in some cases simply suspected of committing a crime (Ibid, 2016). Although 
the EU has stopped short of asking member states to adopt laws that revoke citizenship, it has 
embraced the idea of requiring member states to enact laws that restrict travel and strengthen 
the EU border (European Union, 2017).  
 
The EU response to RFFs builds on these developments but is also distinctive for several 
reasons. First, it has reinforced both a narrow understanding of RFFs and an evolution in the 
language through the adoption of the term FTF, the problems with which are discussed in 
greater detail below. Second, it strengthens the idea that border control is an appropriate 
response to this issue, offering a variety of measures specific to the EU, which includes a 
move to reframe pre-existing migration management databases as counter-terrorism 
instruments. Having considered these contextual factors, the following sections of the article 
aim to map the various ways in which the RFF issue has been discursively constructed. In 
doing so, I show how the EU discourse on RFFs has contributed to the ongoing securitization 
of migration and border control within the EU (see Bigo, 2002; Huysmans, 2000, 2006), and 
explain how the monitoring of travel has emerged as a priority issue for EU counter-terror 
policy makers. Throughout the article I offer further explanation for why it is necessary to 
extend the securitization framework through consideration of the spatial and normative 
dimensions of this process.  
 
Spatiality, the radically threatening figure of the ‘returning foreign fighter’ or ‘foreign 
terrorist fighter’, terrorist travel and control of the EU border  
 A concern with the spatial dimensions of securitization is informed by the aim of moving 
beyond understanding spatiality as the space associated, narrowly, with the geographical 
territory of the nation-state (Agnew, 1999, Croft, 2012; Hansen, 2006; Snetkov, 2017). 
Instead, spatiality in this context highlights the way in which delineation of space is central to 
the process of securitization. This occurs in the EU’s counter-terrorism discourse in two 
ways. First, through the construction of a radically threatening political subject – the RFF or 
FTF – against which the EU and its member states must be secured.4  Importantly, RFFs are 
identified as a major threat to the EU precisely because they can move across different 
spaces, between the inside and the outside, challenging the separation between the once 
distinct realms of internal and external security. Second, through the construction of the EU 
border as an important space where security threats can be identified and prevented from 
entering the EU, reinforcing the idea that the monitoring of travel and enhanced border 
control should form a key dimension of EU counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Although the EU has yet to offer a clear definition of the term, the policy documents reveal a 
common understanding of the way in which the EU conceptualises the figure of the RFF. 
Importantly, the EU’s understanding of this threat cannot be separated from its concern with 
the conflict in Syria, terrorist travel and the security of the EU border. In May 2010, a report 
produced by the EU CTC offered a basic definition that has shaped the EU response in the 
period since. The EU CTC suggested that the threat from RFFs consists of three types of 
people: EU citizens that have travelled to, or returned from, conflict who may represent a 
potential terrorist threat to the EU and its member states; EU citizens that have travelled to, or 
returned from, ‘conflict zones’ who may have been subject to a ‘radicalisation’ process; and 
EU citizens that have returned from ‘conflict zones’ who might give guidance or encourage 
others to commit acts of terrorism (Council of the EU, 2010a: 5). This understanding of RFFs 
has remained consistent and has gained ever more traction in the period since the start of the 
Syrian civil war in 2011. 
 
Significantly, the EU’s failure to develop a definition for this term has meant a limited 
understanding of RFFs has taken hold in the minds of EU policy-makers. RFFs are 
conceptualised narrowly as a highly specific ‘terrorist’ threat linked primarily to the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) group in Iraq and Syria. In developing its response to this issue, the EU has 
failed to take account of insights from the foundational academic literature on the concept of 
FFs (Moore and Tumelty, 2008; 2009; Holman, 2015; Moore, 2015 and Nilsson, 2015) which 
may have been used to better inform policy. Indeed, the literature reveals a great deal of 
complexity in relation to the different types of situation that the concept of FFs can be 
applied. As Moore and Tumelty (2009) explain, it is more appropriate to classify FFs as a 
category of transnational activist, noting the term ‘foreign volunteer’ can provide a better 
basis for capturing the range of FF activity. For example, they point out that alongside a 
variety of combat roles, beyond foreign fighting, these individuals can also take up a range of 
non-combat roles that include ideologues, financiers, trainers and medical experts. The 
impact of the EU discourse on RFFs, by way of contrast, is limiting, offering a very narrow 
understanding of this issue that has served to artificially construct a link between terrorism, 
FFs and travel to and from ‘conflict zones’.  
 
Having moved to focus its counter-terrorism efforts on the issue of RFFs, the EU’s ‘fight 
against terrorism’ has securitized this issue through the language of extreme or major threat. 
The documents analysed referred to the threat in various ways as ‘a serious problem for 
European internal security’, ‘a major threat to the European Union and its member states’ and 
‘a major threat to European security’ (see Council of the EU, 2013: 1; 2014d: 1; and 2014e: 
1). This language is important because, spatially, the construction of the RFF as a threatening 
political subject plays a key role in legitimising the policy response to this issue. Beyond this, 
further complicating the RFF issue has been the EU’s decision to adopt language used by the 
UN, which has introduced a completely new category of terrorist, namely that of the FTF. 
Since the adoption of UNSCR 2178 the EU has also sought to mirror this language and now 
uses the terms FF, RFF and FTF interchangeably. Again, though, the UN terminology 
regarding FFs bears no relation to the foundational academic literature, defining this form of 
violent transnational activism in a similarly misleading way through reference to terrorism 
and FTFs. 
 
The Riga Joint Statement released after the terrorist attacks on the cartoonists of the satirical 
magazine Charlie Hebdo in January 2015, was one of the first EU documents to use this new 
term. It cited the emerging ‘phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters all over the world’ as a 
clear signal that ‘counter-terrorism efforts have to be reinforced both at national and EU 
level’ (European Council, 2015). This term was also referenced on multiple occasions in the 
preamble to the EU’s main legislative instrument in the ‘fight against terrorism’, the renewed 
EU Directive on Combating Terrorism. The document identified the threat from FTFs as a 
serious issue, noting that ‘returning foreign terrorist fighters pose a heightened security threat 
to all Member States’ (European Union, 2017: 5). Significantly, as with the term RFF, the EU 
has yet to offer a clear definition of the term FTF. 
 
Whilst the relationship between FFs and international or domestic terrorism remains unclear 
(see for example, Holman 2015), the adoption of the term FTF by the EU further limits 
understanding of this issue by classifying all FFs as terrorists. This move fails to recognise 
that FFs can occupy multiple categorizations depending upon the context in which the label is 
being used. Interestingly, academic definitions of this concept are significant for not equating 
FFs with terrorism (Moore and Tumelty, 2008; Malet, 2013). For example, Youngman and 
Moore (2017: 21) define foreign volunteers in conflict as individuals that have ‘participate[d] 
in foreign conflict zones throughout history, for reasons of ideology, religion, or financial 
reward – or a combination of the three’. There is no mention of terrorism in their definition, 
nor is there any discussion of citizenship. Furthermore, the EU - as a supra-national security 
actor - is not in a position to revoke citizenship, and yet as noted, some member states have 
adopted this strategy as part of a broader approach to the disruption of travel, which is 
removed from foundational definitional work on foreign fighters. It is also problematic for 
two further reasons. It is illegal under international law to leave a citizen stateless and it runs 
counter to the EU’s stated aim of ‘combat[ting] terrorism globally while respecting human 
rights’ (Council of the European Union, 2005: 2). 
 
As noted above, the term FTF is based on a mistaken assumption that when FFs commit an 
act of violence in a conflict zone this is automatically an act of terrorism. Yet, as the former 
UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Martin Scheinin (2015) explains, this is 
problematic in that it fails to consider the legal complexities of involvement in armed 
conflict. For example, the use of violence in armed conflict ‘can be, depending on the exact 
circumstances, a lawful act of war, a war crime, a crime against humanity, an ordinary crime, 
or - sometimes – terrorism’ (Ibid). Similarly, Nicole Sunday Grove (2018) has highlighted, 
for example, American volunteers who for the purpose of financial reward, adopted 
innovative methods of self-funding and have travelled to Syria to participate in the fight 
against IS. In the documents analysed, this type of activity was not mentioned as part of the 
EU’s policy response. 
 
An explanation for why the term FTF is so problematic can be found in the way in which it 
emerged. The term was first put forward by the GCTF in 2014, then quickly picked up by the 
UN and the EU. Although it represents an evolution in the way in which we discuss FF, much 
of the conceptual work on FTFs consists mainly of reports by think-tanks, journalists and 
international policy-oriented organizations that take little account of the insights provided by 
the academic literature on FFs, treating the concept as unproblematic and a useful 
development in understanding this phenomenon. Youngman and Moore (2017: 7) have been 
particularly critical of this type of research suggesting that much of it is based upon ‘a neglect 
of primary sources, a reliance on ethically dubious methods, and a lack of understanding of 
context and doctrines of activism’, contributing to ‘a stale and flawed information loop’ that 
is preventing the development of effective policies. By adopting the language of FTFs, the 
EU narrows the conceptual parameters, obscures the complexity of FF activity and fails to 
recognise the nuances involved in responding to the issue effectively. 
 
Beyond this, an analysis of the spatial dimensions of the securitization process reveals a 
second consequence of the way in which the RFF issue has been conceptualised. As well as 
securitizing RFFs through their construction as a potential terrorist threat, the EU has also 
linked the RFF issue to migration and travel. In effect, the securitizing language associated 
with the issue of RFFs plays a crucial role in securitizing practice by legitimising the merging 
of border control with counter-terrorism. Since 2011 and the start of the Syrian civil war an 
important evolution has occurred within the EU’s counter-terrorism policy discourse. 
Reaffirming earlier commitments to ‘impeding… travel’ for terrorism purposes (Council of 
the EU, 2005: 3), the EU has emphasised the importance of ‘monitoring’ and ‘detection of 
suspicious travel’ as a key aspect of the response to terrorism (Council of the EU, 2014a: 1). 
The EU argued that it is ‘essential to detect people returning to Europe after having fought in 
Syria, Iraq or any other conflict zone’, with the threat invoked as a way of justifying policies 
designed to enhance ‘checks at external borders’ (Council of the EU, 2014b: 2). This concern 
was most apparent in an EU discussion paper on Preventing Lone Actor Terrorism, which in 
the section on ‘foreign fighters and returnees’ put forward thirteen proposals to combat the 
threat; nine of which were directly linked to travel and border control (Council of the EU, 
2012). 
 
Although the ‘surveillance of populations on the move and the profiling of (un)trusted 
travellers’ was already underway (Bigo 2014: 209); the EU move to invoke the threat from 
RFF is important because it adds further legitimacy to this process. In terms of the spatial 
dimension of the securitization of this issue, the suggestion that identifying ‘suspicious forms 
of travel’ form a central pillar of the EU response to the threat from RFFs/FTFs can be 
understood as contributing to the securitization of the EU border as a space where potential 
terrorist threats can be identified and dealt with. This move was reflected in the decision by 
the EU to further speed up the reform of its 2002 Framework Decision on Combating 
Terrorism, as a result of UNSCR 2178, to include new offences related to travel for the 
purpose of terrorism (European Union, 2002). The new Directive on Combating Terrorism 
was signed into law in February 2017, requiring member states to establish in their domestic 
legislation three new criminal offences related to ‘terrorist travel’.5  
 
The political and social implications of this securitizing move are significant. The EU failed 
to take on board recommendations from its own advisory body, the European Economic and 
Social Committee (EESC), which suggested that the definitions contained in the proposal 
were too vague. Specifically, it found with respect to article 9 on ‘travelling abroad for 
terrorism’ the definition of ‘for terrorism’ was ‘extremely unclear’ (Voronova, 2016: 8). The 
use of this vague and imprecise language has also been criticised because it requires the 
criminalisation of ‘preparatory acts’, such as travelling abroad, which have no direct link to 
terrorism or may not result in an act of terrorism occurring (Amnesty, 2016). Moreover, this 
move has implications for all categories of migrant, in that ‘vaguely worded counter-
terrorism laws’ can be used ‘to violate human rights’ and in particular ‘the rights of… 
refugees and migrants’ (Ibid: 1).  
 
Implicit within this aspect of the spatial dimension of the securitization process, then, is the 
potential terrorist threat posed by the ‘irregular migrant’ or ‘untrusted traveller’ who enters 
the EU from the risky or dangerous places, or spaces, identified in the EU policy documents. 
As Didier Bigo (2008: 19) explains, migration control is constructed as a necessary response 
to this issue and extended to ‘control of persons living in zones labelled ‘at risk’… because 
they correspond to a type of identity or behaviour that is linked to predispositions felt to 
constitute a risk’. This has real world implications for those people who wish to migrate into 
the EU area from countries identified as risky or dangerous in that by association they also 
become a potential source of security threat (see Bigo, 2014; Dover, 2008; Vaughan-
Williams, 2016). The move to adopt border control as the primary response to this issue 
suggests the EU views the RFF not only as a potential terrorist threat but also as a dangerous 
category of migrant and untrusted traveller.  
 
European security governance, preemptive security and border control policies: The 
normative dimensions of the securitization process 
 
The second aspect of securitization that is of significance is the normative dimension of the 
process (see Ciuta, 2009: 322-325). In essence, security discourses always draw on a sense of 
responsibility for the actor involved in relation to how they should act in international politics 
(Hansen, 2006). In relation to EU foreign policy there is an extensive literature on the 
concept of ‘normative power’ Europe (see Manners, 2002), which claims that EU foreign 
policy is based on adherence to a set of norms or values in the formulation and 
implementation of its external security agenda. It is argued here that as the EU has become a 
more holistic security actor (see Zwolski, 2012), this normative imperative has begun to 
impact upon all aspects of EU security policy. This is seen most clearly in the EU’s 
commitment to developing ‘pre-emptive’ forms of security governance (de Goede, 2011). 
The figure of the RFF assumes great important in this regard because it is now one of the 
primary security threats invoked by the EU as a way of legitimising this process.   
 
The EU’s internal security document the European Agenda on Security, covering the period 
2015 to 2020, neatly captures the values underpinning the EU’s emerging approach to 
security. Invoking the threat from RFFs/FTFs, as well as organised crime and cybercrime, the 
EU has suggested that together ‘they require an effective and coordinated response at 
European level’ (European Commission, 2015b: 2). Significantly, in calling for increased 
European cooperation on these issues, including ‘a strong EU response to terrorism and 
foreign terrorist fighters’, the document explained that EU security and counter-terrorism 
policy ‘must be able to react to unexpected events, seize new opportunities and anticipate and 
adapt to future trends and security risks’ (Ibid: 12, 20). This normative imperative to act 
preemptively, in response to anticipated future terrorist incidents, has been described by 
Marieke de Goede (2011: 6) as reflective of an emerging ‘European security culture’, one 
based upon ‘prevention, anticipation and early intervention in crisis and conflict’.  
 
By highlighting the normative dimension of the securitization process, it is possible to reveal 
a commitment to preemptive security in the EU’s policy response to the threat from RFFs. 
Specifically, the EU has presented ‘common high standards of border management’ and the 
enhancement of security at Europe’s external borders as the central pillar of its approach to 
this issue (European Commission, 2015b: 5-6). The EU policy document Stronger and 
Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security, released in April 2016, provides the 
clearest outline of the types of policies envisaged as part of the EU’s counter-terrorism effort. 
Drawing attention to the 50 million non-EU nationals who visited the EU in 2015, alongside 
the 200 million ‘regular’ border crossings that occurred during that year, the document 
invoked ‘the conflict in Syria and crises elsewhere’ as a cause of 1.8 million ‘irregular’ 
border crossings and linked this to the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels in 
2016 through the suggestion that these events ‘bitterly demonstrated the ongoing threat to 
Europe's internal security’ (European Commission, 2016: 2). Significantly, the document 
suggested there is an expectation on the EU, by its citizens, to work towards the development 
of ‘external border controls’, the ‘effective management of migration’ and the strengthening 
of EU ‘border management, migration and security cooperation’ as part of its counter-
terrorism response (Ibid: 3).  
 
Specifically, this normative imperative to act preemptively in response to these broader 
issues, combined with the threat from RFFs, has led the EU to reframe pre-existing databases 
such as the Schengen Information System (SIS II) as potential counter-terrorism instruments, 
providing for the ‘detection of suspicious travel movements’ and ‘suspicious travel related to 
foreign fighters in Syria’ (Council of the EU, 2014e: 8). Indeed, a policy paper on ‘foreign 
terrorist fighter returnees’ from November 2016 rearticulated a need to agree many of the 
measures outlined in the Commission’s Borders and Security policy document, including the 
addition of an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) into the Schengen 
database to record the fingerprints of border crossers.6 In the context of using SIS II for 
counter terrorism purposes, the EU CTC noted that it would be necessary to enter 
‘systematically FTF and (potential) returnees to the SIS II so that return to the Schengen area 
can be identified’, as well as develop an AFIS system given that ‘biometric information is 
increasingly important, in particular given potential use of false passports or infiltration in 
refugee flows’ by ‘foreign terrorist fighters’ (Council of the EU, 2016a: 5).  
 
As part of this process, the EU has called for improvements to information exchange between 
member states, including enhancing the interoperability of pre-existing EU databases 
originally created for the purpose of migration management. In June 2016, the EU produced a 
‘roadmap’ on Enhancing Information Exchange which claimed that ‘security and migratory 
challenges are complex and interconnected’ (Council of the EU, 2016b). The document made 
the case for increasing the interoperability of the SIS, the Visa Information System (VIS) and 
Eurodac databases to allow access to these systems for law enforcement and counter 
terrorism purposes. Throughout the document ‘terrorist travel’ and the threat from FTFs was 
invoked as a way of legitimising this move. This normative imperative to act preemptively, 
using migration and border control instruments, is reflective not only of the EU’s policy 
towards the threat from RFFs but the overarching direction of much of its counter-terrorism 
and security agenda. In essence, the EU is moving towards security policy based around pre-
emptive data-profiling of security threats. As Matthias Leese (2014) explains, the use of 
large-scale analytics is new in the European security experience representing a move away 
from the use of expert knowledge in determining security threats, to a completely anticipatory 
system that uses data profiling of ‘risky’ populations to govern the unknow.  
 
The most significant of the policies adopted by the EU in response to the threat from RFFs 
has been the headline goal of agreeing a European-wide PNR agreement. The EU PNR is a 
directive that requires air carriers operating in the EU to record passenger data for flights 
entering or departing from the EU, as well as providing member states an opportunity to 
collect PNR data concerning selected intra-EU flights. This data is then available for access 
by relevant member state law enforcement authorities to preemptively target those who may 
be involved in transnational crime and terrorism. Interestingly, the EU PNR directive has a 
long history having first been proposed by the European Commission in 2007. The 
development of the PNR was initially held back by the signing of the Lisbon treaty, with a 
second attempt by the Commission to push through the PNR again thwarted in 2013 by the 
EU’s own Civil Liberties Committee (Leese, 2014).  
 
The EU PNR was signed on 27 April 2016 with the issue of RFFs playing an important role 
in EU member states reaching agreement on this measure. In many of the documents 
analysed, the EU repeatedly invoked the threat from RFFs to legitimise the passing into law 
of the PNR directive. For example, in May 2014 the EU CTC suggested the development of 
the EU PNR ‘should be considered a priority’ (Council of the EU, 2014d: 7). Similarly, in a 
parliamentary debate from March 2016, the MEP Alex Voss invoked the terrorist attacks in 
Paris in November 2015, claiming that ‘We owe this EU PNR Directive to the victims of the 
French terrorist attacks’ (EPP Group, 2016). The Commission’s Borders and Security 
strategy, released just before the signing into law of the EU PNR, succinctly summarised the 
logic underpinning this policy, explaining that PNR data is ‘helpful and necessary to identify 
high risk travellers in the context of combatting terrorism, drugs trafficking… and other 
serious crimes’ and arguing that it was necessary for the directive to ‘be adopted and 
implemented as a matter of urgency’ (European Commission, 2016: 15).  
 
The PNR system, which has been pushed through in part as a response to the securitization of 
the RFF issue and the perceived need to monitor ‘suspicious travel’, has implications for all 
migrants. The EU has identified the monitoring of migration flows as an essential aspect of 
its response to this issue, claiming ‘there is evidence that terrorists have used routes of 
irregular migration to enter the EU and then moved within the Schengen area undetected’ 
(European Commission, 2016: 3). Significantly, then, in its approach to security threats, the 
EU now views border management, counter-terrorism and migration control as ‘dynamically 
interconnected’ (Ibid.) Yet, as Sarah Leonard (2015) suggests, there is little evidence that 
border control measures are an effective response to the threat from terrorism, with the real 
thrust of EU border control about preventing irregular migration rather than combating 
terrorism. If we take the EU’s headline goal in response to RFFs, the development of the 
PNR directive, this criticism carries even more weight. As Evelien Brouwer (2009) explains, 
when it was originally proposed the PNR was put forward as a broader measure designed for 
combating terrorism and organised crime. However, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency 
(2008: 13) found that the original proposal contained ‘open ended’ and ‘imprecise’ 
formulations of key terms, such as ‘terrorist offence’, and required further evidence that ‘the 
collection and use of PNR data for law enforcement purposes is necessary and adds value to 
the fight against terrorism’.  
 
In the period since, like many of the EU counter-terrorism measures before it, the EU has not 
taken steps to assess the necessity, legitimacy or effectiveness of PNR data as a counter-
terrorism tool (see Hayes and Jones, 2013). Again, this has implications for individuals 
wishing to migrate into the EU area. The directive allows for the storage and processing of a 
large amount of data on millions of individuals travelling into and out of the EU, where 
everyone is placed under a form of monitoring, including EU citizens, regardless of whether 
they have committed a crime or not. Having reached agreement on the PNR directive, the 
fear remains that it will be used not for counter-terrorism purposes but rather as an instrument 
through which irregular migration is controlled or prevented. Indeed, Bigo et al. (Ibid: 18) 
have suggested that the EU should evaluate the necessity of the PNR and unless it can be 
demonstrated that it serves the purpose of fighting terrorism and serious crime ‘it should be 
abandoned’. The move to adopt the PNR, as well as the steps take to reframe other migration 
management databases as counter-terrorism instruments, can be understood as a clear 
example of how securitization occurs in the EU. The EU has invoked the threat from RFFs to 
push through, or extend the remit of, controversial border measures that are contributing to 
the securitization of travel and migration in the EU.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The EU response to the RFF issue provides an important case through which to explore the 
link between the language of EU counter-terrorism and the ongoing securitization of 
migration and EU border control policy. Theoretically, the article sought to contribute to the 
‘rapidly evolving second generation scholarship on securitization’ (Stritzel, 2012: 524)), by 
emphasising the importance of context when analysing the securitization process and 
highlighting the spatial and normative dimensions of the EU move to securitize the RFF 
issue. The purpose of this was three-fold. First, to extend our understanding of the 
securitization process by revealing dynamics that are unaccounted for in the traditional 
approach advanced by the Copenhagen School. Second, to provide a framework through 
which to map the construction of the RFF as a security threat and highlight the relationship 
between securitizing language and security practice. Third, by using discourse analysis as a 
method, the approach adopted here provides a framework for analysing the political and 
social consequences of the securitization of the RFF issue, demonstrating how research and 
analysis which bridges the divide between security theory and security policy can benefit 
from the integration of empirically-driven policy analysis. 
 
Following from this, the article has problematised the way in which the EU conceptualises 
the figure of the RFF, arguing that it constructs RFFs narrowly as a highly specific ‘terrorist’ 
threat linked to the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. For the EU, RFFs are unique in that, spatially, 
they traverse and collapse the distinction between the internal and external dimensions of 
security. RFFs are understood to be citizens of EU member states who have travelled to 
dangerous places, or spaces, outside the Union, that may at some point return to the EU and 
launch a terrorist attack against a member state. It was argued that this understanding of RFFs 
is problematic because it is both limiting and fails to take account of insights that might be 
gleaned from research on FFs, such as a recognition of the diversity of FF activity or the 
problems inherent in the use of citizenship as an analytical category (see Youngman and 
Moore, 2017). Moreover, it was argued that the EU has repeated mistakes made at the UN 
through the adoption of the term FTF, which exacerbates this problem, by artificially 
constructing all FFs as a potential terrorist threat, when in reality FFs can occupy multiple 
categorisations depending upon the context in which the term is being used.  
 
By reading the EU documents through reference to the spatial and normative dimensions of 
the securitization process, this analysis has revealed two distinct effects of the way in which 
the EU has approached the RFF issue. First, spatially, the EU response plays a key role in the 
ongoing securitization of migration in the EU area through the advancement of border control 
measures as the most appropriate response to this problem. This response suggests that the 
EU views the RFF not only as a potential terrorist threat but also as a dangerous category of 
migrant and untrusted traveller; a threat which requires the EU border to be secured. Second, 
the discourse on RFFs creates a normative imperative upon the EU to act through the 
development of policies designed to prevent the potential terrorist attacks of the future, with 
the EU response characterised by the embrace of preemptive and anticipatory forms of 
security governance. This is reflected in the move to make EU databases originally designed 
for migration management interoperable for the purpose of counter-terrorism and in the 
creation of new measures like the PNR directive. The EU has used the window of opportunity 
that followed major terrorist incidents involving RFFs to further justify the ongoing 
development of preemptive forms of security practice and its role as an authoritative actor in 
the field of security.  
 
There is, however, little to suggest that border control or surveillance of travel will result in 
an effective response to the RFF problem. The EU has yet to offer evidence to support the 
assertion that the adoption of the PNR directive will help in responding to the issue of RFFs. 
The move to strengthen the EU border for counter-terrorism purposes is even more 
perplexing given that terrorism is predominantly a local phenomenon. In Europe, 
notwithstanding a few incidents, many of those arrested for terrorist offences have never been 
abroad or crossed a border. This has two implications for research in this area. First, there is a 
need for engagement with policy-makers to understand why the EU has sought to bring 
migration, border-control and travel into its counter-terrorism response. Second, there is a 
need for in-depth analysis of all terrorist attacks in the EU area to ascertain the extent to 
which border control measures may have helped to prevent those incidents from occurring. 
Finally, the move to securitize migration, travel and the EU border through the linking of 
these areas to counter-terrorism and the RFF issue has another important consequence. It 
further constructs all migrants, albeit implicitly, as a potential source of terrorist threat, 
whereby travellers and migrant populations are now a primary target of preemptive 
surveillance for counter-terrorism purposes. In the EU the securitization of the border 
continues apace, with the threat from RFFs playing a key role in that process. 
                                                          
Notes 
1 See for example the Europol Terrorism Situations and Trends Reports for 2016 and 2017.  
2 By performative I mean the way in which the use of the term security in specific situations reorders social 
relations as security relations (see Croft, 2012). As Croft explains, what is important is not only the 
enacting of policy but the way in which the process of enacting policy reshapes society.   
3 It should be noted that these two categories are ‘not explicit’ within the discourse but rather provide a set 
of analytical lenses through which securitization can be identified (see Hansen, 2006: p. 40-41.) 
4 As Hansen (2006:42) explains, spatiality need not only be thought of through reference to territorially 
based referent objects but can ‘also be articulated as abstract political space, boundaries, and 
subjectivities’. 
5 The new directive on combating terrorism completed the process of transcribing the proposals for 
criminalisation of travel made in the UNSCR2178 into EU law, which had been recommended by the EU 
CTC in October 2014 (Council of the European Union, 2014a: 2). 
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